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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CONSTRUCTION

; ,,f !

'"cl ilhl(']T()RD INSURANCE,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
DWINN A. HENION,
of
BARI LYN BLAIR,
daughter of
RAFFY A. BLAIR, deceased, and
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
l'TAH,

Case No. 19006

Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
A petition was filed by Blake Stevens Construction Company
ond Hartford Insurance Company, defendants below,

for a review of

the finding of the Industrial Commission of the average weekly

uf Barry A. Blair who died as a result of an accident in the
cr,urse of his employment for Blake Stevens Construction Company.
DISPOSITION !lY TEE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
After a hearing on the denial by the plaintiffs of
l1ahtl1t/

for death benefits to the afterborn daughter of the

-,Sf'd, ,\dministrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen found that the
,J,>11t

's ,1ve>raqe weekly wage at the time of his death was

in l''"r h'C'ek c'nd that his dciughter was entitled to benefits

based upon those earnings.
contesting the inclusion in the calcuCJtion

or

the <1ecf',1se<1'

average weekly wage of amounts paid tu him fur living
The Industrial Commission affirmed ,Judge 1\llen's finding in

J

unanimous decision.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant requests that the court affirm the
Industrial Commission's order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant accepts as accurate the plaintiffs'
summary of the facts with the additional statement that the
evidence upon which the Commission based its findings both as
to the paternity of the minor applicant and the earnings of the
deceased was uncontracted in every respect. (R27-47).
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO INCLUDE PAYMENTS TO
A WORKER FOR LIVING EXPENSES IN ITS
CALCULATION 01 HIS AVERJ\GF: \·iEEKLY \'JAGE.
The Supreme Court,
Commission,

in reviewing acts of the Industrial

is limited to a determinCJtion of whether the Cornrn1s'

has exceeded its powers or disregarded some positive prov1s1on
law in making or denying an award.
Industrial Commission,

G6 Ut:ih 173,

240 Pcic. 44C

1192'i!.

The issue raised h\' this petiti<•n is \·!hethor the IncL:c'
Commission was

authc;r17cd

the deceased by his

tn consider

evidenc(' r;f

l i':i ng

-:::-

tn

: " 1'"·rd
' ' 1•

for his hourly wage in making its finding of his
weekly wage" within the meaning of the Compensation Act.
;;ection 35-1-75 Utah Code Ann.

1 if' l

I

(Replacement Volume 4B

•wket Supplement) provides the basis for computing a

workct 's average weekly wage which, in turn, determines the rate
dt

which workmen's compensation benefits are payable to his

dependents in the event of his death by industrial accident.
)5-1-75. Average weekly wage - Basis of
computation. (1)
Except as otherwise
provided in this act, the average weekly
wage of the injured employee at the time
of the injury shall be taken as the basis
upon which to compute the weekly compensation
rate and shall be determined as follows:
(a)
If at the time of the injury the wages
are fixed by the year, the average weekly
wage shall be that yearly wage divided by
52.
(b)
If at the time of the injury the wages
are fixed by the month, the average weekly
wage shall be that monthly wage divided by
4 1/3.
(c)
If at the time of the injury the wages
are fixed by the week, that amount shall be
the average weekly wage.
(d)
If at the time of the injury the wages
are fixed by the date, the weekly wage shall
be determined by multiplying the daily wage
by the number of days and fraction of days
in the week durinq which the employee under
a contract of
was working at the time
of the accident, or would have worked if the
accident had not intervened.
In no case shall
the daily wage be multiplied by less than three
for the purpose of determining the weekly wage.
(e)
If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the
average weekly wage shall
be determined by multiplying the hourly rate
-3-

by the number of hours the
would have worked for the week if lhe
accident had not intervened.
In
case shall the hourly wage be multiplied
by less than 20 for the purpose of
determining the weekly wage.

no-

(f)
I f at the tirne of the injury the
hourly wage has not been fixed or cannot
be ascertained, the wage for the purpose
of calculating compensation shall be the
usual wage for similar services where those
services are rendered by paid employees.
(g) (l)
If at the time of the injury the
wages are fixed by the output of the employee,
the average weekly wage shall be the wage
most favorable to the employee computed
by dividing by thirteen the wages, not
including overtime or premium pay, of the
employee earned through that employer in the
first, second, third, or fourth period of
thirteen consecutive calendar weeks in the
52 weeks immediately preceding the injury.
(2)
If the employee has been employed by
that employer less than thirteen calendar
weeks immediately preceding the injury, his
average weekly wage shall be computed as under
subsection (1) (g) (1), presuming the wages,
not including overtime or premium pay, to be
the amount he would have earned had he been so
employed for the full thirteen calendar weeks
immediately preceding the injury and had
worked, when work was available to other
employees, in a similar occupation.
(3)
If none of the methods in subsection
will fairly determine the average weekly
wage in a particular case, the commission shall
use such other method as will, based on the
facts presented, fairly determine the employee's
average weekly wage.
(1)

(4)
"'lhen the average weekly waqe of the injur
employee at the time of the in Jury is deter;cineci
as in this section provided, it shall be taken
as the basis upon which to compute the weeklJ
compensation rate.
After tho weekly cornrensat10
has been cornpu ted, it shu 11 be round0c1 tc' the
nearest dollar.
-4-

Court has recently construed Section 75 of the
11 ' " "

n1•

1 1

Act with particular reference to the authority

cd upon the Commission by subsection ( 3).

In Craig

l:u1nlidm Produce v. Industrial Commission, Utah Sup.Ct. No. 17968
1.13nuary 24, 1983)

the employer sought reversal of an award

by the Commission which was based upon a calculation of his

Pmrloyee's average weekly wage which included his earnings from
a separate part-time job.

The plaintiffs argued that Section 75

of the act conferred no express authority upon the Comrnission
to combine earnings from two employers and that the Comrnission
was therefore limited in its authority to multiplying the employee's
hourly wage in his employment at the moment of injury by the
number of hours he worked on that job in accordance with subsection
le).

This Court rejected the employer's narrow construction
ot the Industrial Commission's statutory authority.
i laim·•! th:it the Legislature intended by subsection

(3)

Justice Hall exto give

the Commission broad authority to use "methods over and above
those specified in subsection (1) as will permit it to fairly
.1etccrmine the injured employee's weekly wage".
<:onun1

ssion,

supra.

Burnham v. Industrial

The Court's analysis of the question in Burnham

suqyosts that the Industrial Commission's determination of what
•s

•.1ir
1

will not be disturbed unless its method of computation

•r1trc1r·: to the express provisions of the statute or unless

· ,_,slllt is incompatible with the underlying purpose of the
1 h11cn' s

C'nmpensa ti on /\ct.

-5-

A.
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINc;
IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH ANY
SPECIFIC PROVISION OF THE COMPENSATION ACT.
The plaintiffs argue that the Commission's considerat 1
of subsistence payments in making its average weekly wage find in
is inconsistent with Utah law because a specific provision
such payments to be regarded as wages which is part of a model
compensation act is not found in the Utah act

and because the

definition of the word "wages" in the Wage Claim Act, Utah Code
Anno. Sec. 34-28-2(2) (Replacement Volume 4B 1974), et seq. does
not expressly include payments for living expenses.
A related argument was made by the employer in Burnham
v. Industrial Commission, supra, as noted, and was rejected
by this Court.

Unless there is an express prohibition on the

manner of calculation employed, the question is simply whether
the Commission could lawfully employ such a method under subsection (3).
Furthermore, there is nothing in the legislative histor
of Section 75 which remotly implies, as plaintiffs suggest, that
the Utah Legislature intended to exclude living expenses from
the statutory definition of wages in the Compensation Act.

The

plaintiffs state that Section 75 of the Utah act is "modeled
after" Section 19 of the proposed "Workmen's Compensation and
Rehabilitation Law" drafted by the Council on State Governments.
That provision is set forth along with the Section 75 in Appenc
"A".

However, a comparison of the two rc\'e<J.ls more differences
-()-

c_,11111

lar1tiese

first,
, , ,,. /1

'"'"e

it is obvious that the model act provides

detailed scheme for calculating the average weekly

thdn does the Utah statute with specific provisions applic-

Jhle to minors, apprentices, volunteer firemen, seasonal workers
and persons with dual employment.

Secondly, it contains no pro-

vision comparable to Section 75(3) vesting authority in the
Commission to use wage calculation methods which are not specifically
enumerated.
Furthermore, the wage definition which plaintiffs contend
rrnr Legislature deliberately omitted from the Utah act is not
found 1n Section 19 of the model act but is one of twenty-five
definitions in Section 2 of the suggested legislation.

The

definition section of the Utah Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann.,
Section 35-1-44,

(Replacement Volume 4B, 1974), contains only eight

,;efini tions and bears no relationship to the model act.
cantly,

Signifi-

the Utah act at Section 44(8) defines "average weekly
simply as "the average weekly earnings arrived at by

the rules provided in Section 35-1-75".
If any conclusion about the Legislature's intention is
i11st1fier1 by a comparison of the two acts, it is that our Legisl•Lure disavowed any attempt to address all the situations in which
U1E' vagc determination might involve peculiar considerations in
"' 1 "'

d

L>roacJ grant of discretion to the Industrial Commission

irr11d<1te calculation methods consistent with the purpose of

-7-

It is also noteworthy that the model act in

1.

contains a specific provision requiring that wages from
be combined which is, of course, absent from the Utah act.

Tl·,

plaintiffs'view that the omission from the Ctah act of a
manditory calculation provision in the model act reflects a
legislative intent to prohibit the Commission from employing
such a method would foreclose the result reached by this Court
in Burnham.
Plaintiffs next contend that the definition of the terr
"wages" in Sec. 34-28-2 (2) Utah Code Ann.

(Replacement Volume 4'

1974) which applies to the Wage Claims Act substantiates their
position that payments for living expenses are not wages.
pertinent part,

In

that section states that
The word "wages"means all amounts
due the employee for labor or
services •

Given our Legislature's specific provision that "wages"
in the Compensation Act are to be calculated and defined by the
formula set out in Section 75, it seems minimally useful to
examine definitions of the term found elsewhere in the code whic
are expressly limited in their application to other chapters.
The defendants submit, however,
on,

''amounts due

that the definition of wages rel

for labor or services

exclude payments for living expenses.
pay an employee a specific amount

" does not

If an

li,'inq expenses in ret

for his labor and services and then refused to do s0,
-8-

aareed tc

th0 defer.

1 wst
1

'"

that these unpaid amounts would indeed qualify as "wages"
the

meaning of the Wage Claims Act and that an action to

them would lie.
The Industrial Commission is not prohibited from
including living expenses in its calculation of a worker's
average weekly wage nor is there any indication that the Legislature intended that such earnings not be considered.
B.
THE INCLUSION OF LIVING EXPENSES
IN AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE CALCULATIONS IS
A REASONABLE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
BY THE COMMISSION IN KEEPING WITH
THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT.
If more than one inference or conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, it is not the Supreme Court's
perogative to direct which one the Commission should chose.
Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 6, 47 P.2d 1050 (1935).

Pace v.

Similarly,

when this Court is reviewing an exercise by the Commission of
discretion committed to it by the Legislature to adopt the
calculation method it deems fairest in a particular case,
t!te Supreme Court is not called upon to substitute its judgment
for that of the Commission but simply to decide whether the
Commission abused its discretion, e.g., Probst v. Industrial
1:ommiss1on, 588 P.2d 717

(Utah 1978).

It is the nearly unanimous rule in other jurisdictions
thd

t

payments made to an employee by his employer for living

•1·cnsPs in the form of free room or board, or fixed amounts to
t,

1

those costs, when they are understood by the parties

,., nst1tute part of the consideration given for an employee's
-9-

services, are to be included in the culculation "f l1is w,v",
for compensation purposes,
Compensation, Sec. 60.12; 82

2A Larson The Law of Workmen's
Am

Jur. 2d.

"Workmen's Compensat1c

Sec. 372.
The plaintiffs correctly note that the legislatures of
many states have expressly provided that the value of board, rent,
housing, etc. when given to a worker by his employer are part
of his wages, Jess Parrish Memorial Hospital v. Ansill, 390 So.
2d. 1201 (Fla. App. 1980);
P.2d 77(1961);

Waldroupe v. Kelly, 189 Kan.99, 367

H.J. Heinz Co. v. Wood, 181 Okl. 389,74 P.2d 353

(1937);

Parrish v. Industrial Commission, 15 Colo. 2d. 538, 379

P.2d 384

(1963), but they contended that because the question

so often been resolved legislatively, reference to the law of
other jurisdictions does not aid the Court in this review.

Howeve-

the prevalance of statutes resolving this issue in the same
manner as did the Commission, the body which under our law
was given the discretion to do so, actually reflects the
reasonableness of its determination.
Furthermore, it is the general rule in jurisdictions
without such express provisions to include living expenses or
the value of room and board in claulcation of average waaes.
For example, the Supreme Court of Arizona in Matlock v. IndustnaCommission, 70 Ariz. 25, 215 i'.?d 612

(1950)

held that the actu,1 '

value of housing and food provided to a ranch hand should he aJ'
to his salary to compute is average wugc.

The courts of Louisi-w

have long held that when un employer prov id es loclci i nq nr rne<'il s
-10-

i'

"'I 1
,

,

er or a sum to pay for them their value should be

111 1lcd

0s part of his average wages.
383 So. 2d 1067

Morgan v. Equitable

(La. App. 1980), Ardven

. S••uthern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 134 So. 2d 323 (La.
J9Gl); also, Bannister v. Shepherd, 191 S.C. 165, 4 S.E.
2d 7 (1939).
The plaintiffs make much of the fact that the employer
in this case paid the deceased's living expenses when he was
required to work out of town but not when he was able to live
at home and argue that such a case should be distinguished from
one where an employer provides or pays for lodging or meals
throughout the year.

Assuming that it is within the Industrial

Commission's power to include payments for living expenses in
the average wage calculation, however, there is no basis in logic
nor in the policy of the law for requiring it to make such a
rli stinction.

In states which have adopted a rule that payments for
l i '." 1ng expenses are part of a worker's wages, those payments are
typic0lly included even if they are only made when a person is
''"'''

from his home eating in restaurants and lodging in hotels
i.n Cosgriff

H,

"J.

Duluth Firemen's Relief Ass'n., 233 Minn. 233,

.\·!.

2J 250

(1951) and American Surety of New York v. Underwood,

\J .

.>d 551

(Tex. Civ. App. 1934).

',,,JI

''""I

The latter case involved

ing salesman who was reimbursed for out of pocket expenses
,,ml hotels while on the road even though he lived at

,1thl'rw1se.

-11-

Similarly, in appl'/inq

ci

!Jew York compensat1un stat'"'-'

which based compensation payments on a proven diminution of
income, a New York appellate court concluded that a travelling
salesman who sustained an injury which prevented him from
and obtaining subsistence payments in addition to his salary
had suffered a wage loss even though he continued to receive hie
salary since he would no longer have the cost of his food and
housing borne by his employer.

Rowe v. Kenney, 7 NYS 2d 768

(N.Y. 3rd App.Div. 1938).
This application of the rule makes sense.

Payment of

out of state living expenses is not simply reimbursement to a
worker for out of pocket expenses occasioned by his job but
constitutes an increase in his earnings during that time.

Suet

a worker spends money for food whether he is at home or out of
town.

If at

home, he pays for his food out of his hourly waqe5

When on the road, however, an additional payment is made to hirr
with which to cover the same expense.
It is true that the cost of a motel room miqht
an expense incurred solely because of his job in the' rase of
a person who continues to pay rent or to discharae a mortaage
a house from which he is absent.
the cost of housinq,

However,

like the cc st of

payment of living expenses,

1

fond,

in the aener.:il sense

1

is one which, \·.Jithc

a worker must prn\11c1e f1yr r_iut of 111

hourl:/ wages but which with an

i ti1-nal

he· rr:i·: co,·er

reduce so as to create an increase nf his carn1nqs.
-1 :'-

i\S

the

'I'f:-·Y·

r·<>url
crr1d d ,

/4 s.w.

observed in The American Surety Co., case,
2d at 553,

Whether an employee maintains his own
home or not he must nevertheless have
a place to sleep and food to eat, and
some pecuniary advantage must ordinarily
result to him in having these necessities
supplied by his employer.
Furthermore, there is no evidence in this case that
the employer's payment of a subsistence allowance was contingent
upon an actual outlays of money by the deceased for living
expenses.

Presumably, if he chose to sleep in a tent and bring

his own food he would have been equally entitled to the additional
sum as a bonus for out of town work.

Additionally, the plaintiffs'

suggestion that the subsistence payrrent was intended in part to
1·over "travel expenses", Brief of Plaintiffs, P.6, is without
foundation in the record.

There is no evidence that the deceased

spent money for gasoline or any other cost of transportation
was to be reimbursed by the subsistence payment.
In sum,

there in nothing about the nature of the payment

of living expenses to a worker who is out of town which makes
it unreasonable to treat those payments like other extra payments
f.or f'r ivision of living expenses in return for work.

The plaintiffs' contention that the Commission's
rirl1r·,1t1on of Section 75 of the Act is inconsistent with the
I

rrr

l'l1r

"t

the Workmen's Compensation Act is equally without merit.

purpose of the act, i_n the words of this court, is
-13-

to substitute

and economico.l

ci

more hum,1r11L1r1:1r1

systf'm r.C

for injured \vurkmen or thL'ir depenUcnt:,
in case of de1th which the more h11marn'
and moral conception of our time
requires .

Barker Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 10-1 Utcih 371, l''
P.2d 266, 270

(1943), and to
alleviate hardships upon workers
and their dependents due to
industrial injuries.

Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185, 29 r.2d 689,
694

(1955).

Again and again this court has held that the act

should be liberally construed to afford coverage and give erfect
Burnham, supra, at P.15, Spencer v. Industrial

its purposes.

Commission, supra.
The plaintiffs contend that if living expenses are
included in the calculation of wagEs upon which compensation

t

0

the dependent of the deceased employee is based, she will recei"'c·
Their argument is that if the deceased were ;il1"c

a "windfall".

the cost of his own food and housing would consume the payment
for living expenses and that it woulcl net represent any incrPase
in funds available for the care of a dependent.

Once he is rleac,

it would be an unfair benefit to his surviving dependent to
her to

collect

COfnfJCnSatlOn based upon rici;:mentS lntL'ncJC

1

tr

cover those expenses.
The suggestion t!lClt

the Comr.i1ss1on 1 s

d.h'dr,1

,1

\\:,-i:-·

fall" to a child who will ne\·er see her "crth01- ico c:itl1'''
In any

it is the defendunt' s

\'lC'W,

payment for li'.'ing expensc:s is ;v1t s1r1

,-is

nr)t<'•l

icir":,l1!

L',11

!

"'

1( 1

1 lic1r

,

, 1,'

c'xpenses occasioned solely by employment but is a bonus

1

t '11

food and housing which increases the total earnings

for other purposes including the care of dependents.

, 1 L1blL'

11nrN1ver, the plaintiffs' argument could be made in any death
case.

Whenever the wage earner dies all of his "living expenses"

are eliminated.

Nevertheless, the Legislature has determined

that !us dependents should have benefits in the amount of twothirds of his average weekly wages, as defined pursuant to Section
75, up to fixed maximum without requiring any deduction

from his

wages for those expenses which will no longer be incured or directing any inquiry towards what portion of his average weekly wage the
deceased actually had available for the care of his dependents
during his life.
The purpose of the act is effectuated when it is
liberally construed to afford coverage and to reduce the economic
consequences to his family of a worker's death by industrial
lr:cldent.

CONCLUSION
Rather than attempting to anticipate the many factual
which might arise in calculating a worker's average
wcckl· wage, our Legislature in Section 75 set forth several basic
1cal formulas which would resolve the issue in most cases
,1,,

ttll'n

•Jave the Industrial Commission authority to use any other

which would more fairly resolve the issue.
10 wcnts
,n:, 1, :\-. 1 C'ci

,1 ]

By deciding

to an employee for living expenses should be
<Jnq

\Vl

th his hour

l

_j

,,,ages in determining his average
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weekly wage, the Commission has reached the same result

Jc,

1 ,

1v

every court and legislature which has aclclressecl the issuC'.
consideration of those earnings in this case is a reasonaLile

exercise of its discretion and is consistent with the humanitar,·
purpose of the act and the liberal construction this Court has
always given it.
This Court's jurisdiction on review is limited.

WherE

substantial evidence supports the Commission's findings and it
has not abused the discretion conferred upon it by law, the
Commission's order should be affirmed.
DATED this

day of May, 1983.

Attorney for Defendants
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l\PPENDIX "A"

Utah Code Annotated
Section 35-1-75 (Replacement
Vol.4B, 1981 Pocket Supplement)

w0rkTnen's Compensation

:in,TRel1'1bi 1 i ta tion
Section 19

-----

Section 1 9. ( Determination
,if Aver3qe Weekly Wage) .

35-1-75. Average weekly wageBasis of computation.
(1)
Except as otherwise provided
in this act, the average weekly
wage of the injured employee
at the time of the injury shall
be taken as the basis upon
which to compute the weekly
compensation rate and shall
be determined as follows:

Except as otherwise provided
in this act, the average
weekly wage of the injured
employee at the time of the
rniury shall be taken as
the basis upon which to
compute compensation and
shall be determined as
'ollows:

(a)
If at the time of the
injury the wages are fixed by
the year, the average weekly
wage shall be that yearly wage
divided by 52.

(a)
I f at the time of the
iniury the wages are fixed
by the week the average
,;eekly wage should be that
emount;

(b)
If at the time of the
injury the wages are fixed by
the month, the average weekly
wage shall be that monthly wage
divided by 4 1/3.

!bl
I f at the time of
the injury the wages are
fixed by the month, the
J1·erage weekly wage shall
Ge the monthly wage so
fi,ed multi plied
by 12
olhi divided by 52;

(c)
If at the time of the
injury the wages are fixed by
the week, that amount shall be
the average weekly wage.

1c)
Tf at the time of
the in j ur ,. the wages are
'ixed by the year, the
J\'er.Joe ,,veekly wage shall be
10,, ;earl
waqe so fixed
;, ' ic'le<I
5 2;

(d)
I f at the time of the
injury the wages are fixed
by the date, the weekly wage
shall be determined by multiplying the daily wage by the
number of days and fraction of
days in the week during which
the employee under a contract
of hire was working at the
time of the accident, or would
have worked if the accident
had not intervened.
In no case

If cJt the time
the waqes
'•' IY,.' the day, hour
lie· · utput of the

I) I I)

i 111111 "'

t

1

t',

slic1!J

the overage weekly

be the wage most
the employee

t«L:" tll
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computed by dividing by
13 the wages (not ihcluding
overtime or premium pay) of
said employee earned in the
employ of the employer in
the first, second, third, or
fourth period of 13 consecutive calendar weeks in the
52 weeks immediately preceeding the injury.

shall the daily waqp
multiplied by less thcll, ,,
for the purpose of dete: ,., 1
the weekly wage.
(e)
If at the time of 11,.
injury the wages are fixec
the hour, the average week:.
wage shall be determined
multi plying the hourly
by the number of hours the
employee would have worked :
the week if the accident
not intervened.
In no case
shall the hourly wage be
multiplied by less than 20
the purpose of
·
weekly wage.

(2)
If the employee has
been in the employ of the
employer less than 13 calendar weeks immediately preceeding the injury, his
average weekly wage shall
be computed under the foregoing paragraph, taking the
wages (not including overtime or premium pay) for
such purposes to be the amount
he would have earned had he
been so employed by the employer the full 13 calandar
weeks immediately preceeding
the injury and had worked,
when work was available to
other employees in a similar
occupation.

(f)
If at the time of tb•
injury the hour 1 y wage has ·
been fixed or cannot be ascertained, the wage for
purpose of calculating comfensation shall be the usual
wage for similar services
where those services are re:·
dered by paid employees.
( g) ( 1)
I f at the time or
the injury the wages are fr..
by the output of the emploYt
the average weekly wage sha:
be the wage most favorable
the employee computed by c:
ing by thirteen the wages,
including overtime or
pay, of the employee earne:
through that employer in
first, second, third, or
fourth period of thirteen
consecutive calendar weeks
the 52 weeks immediate!/
preceeding the inJurv.

(e)
If at the time of the
injury the hourly wage has not
been fixed or can not be assertained, the wage for the purpose
of calculating compensation
shall be taken to be the usual
wage for similar services
where such services are
rendered by paid employees.
( f)
In occupations which
are exclusively seasonal and
therefore cannot be carried
on throughout the year, the
average weekly wage shall be
taken to be one-fiftieth of
the total wages which the
employee has earned from all
occupations during the 12

(2)

If the employee

employed by that

than thirteen calendar tlC•
immediately prececlinq the
his average wet'kly wage er
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'II t hs
ironedia tely
1111<1 the injury.

('JJ
!11 the case of volunteer
emenr police, and civil

111

Jcfensc members or trainees,
the income benefits shall
be based on the average
weekly wage in their regular
employment.
lh)

If the employee was a
apprentice or trainee
when injured, and it is
established that under normal
conditions his wages should
be expected to inc reage
durin1 the period of cisat, lity, that fact may be
considered in computing his
average wec:-_ly wage.
Wh2 n the employee
v.od.i 10
co,1lracts -,-1i th two u:r m0re
e.r1ployers and the defendant
employ"'r :ids knowledge of
c•Jch crr,to.Loyment prior to the
injury, hj s waJcs from 3ll
such emelover s shal J be con(i )

.!.S

:iidered as if earn'2G
l L3..blE
e11Sat

the

...:rorn
COm;::--

be computed as under sutsection (1) (g) (1), presumiw
the wages, not including
overtime or premium pay, to
the amount he would have ear__oed
had he been so employed
the full thirteen calendar
weeks immediately preceding
the injury and had worke.i. wh=,!'
work was available to other
employees, in a similar cccupation.
( 3)
If Pone of the methoc"'
in subsection (1) will fair::
the average week:y
wage in a particular case,
commission s.1all use such ot-".e "."
method as will, based on the
facts presented, fairly
mine tne
average
Wl"eklv wage
1

wr,er_

c..ve:raqe

wase of the it1ju.._ed
the
of the injury iE
detecmined as in this
provided, it shall be taken
the basis upo1·, w:iicl1 to cc.mp'_·
ti1e weekly compansation rate.
:\fter tre
cc•mpcnsc tior
has been compJted, it shall
rounded tc.

_e;
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